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 § 1.1 INTRODUCTION
 In this treatise, the term “insider trading” means trading by  anyone (inside  or outside 
of the issuer) on any type of material 1 nonpublic 2 information about the issuer or about 
the market for the security. “Tipping” or “insider tipping” is the communication by 
 anyone of this type of information to another person. Thus, “insider trading” and 
“insider tipping” are not confined to corporate “insiders” like executives or even to 
those employed by the company. 3 Most commentators and authorities seem to use 
“insider trading” in this broad sense, 4 although the term may seem a misnomer. 5 
1  For the definition of “material” under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 
SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, see  infra § 4.2. 
2  For the definition of “nonpublic” under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see  infra § 4.3. 
3  On rare occasions, this treatise uses the phrase “corporate insider” to refer to a corporate 
employee or the equivalent of such an employee. For examples of the use of the phrase “cor-
porate insider,” see discussion of the “classical special relationship triangle”  infra notes 30–33 
and accompanying text; see also  infra §§ 5.2.1, 6.7. 
4  See Henning,  Between Chiarella and Congress: A Guide to the Private Cause of Action for 
Insider Trading Under the Federal Securities Laws , 39  U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990) (“The term 
‘inside information’ is now common parlance . . . to describe situations in which previously 
undisclosed information is used to gain an unfair transactional or tactical advantage.”) (foot-
note omitted). 
5  See Henning,  supra note 4, at 1 n.2 (“The term ‘insider trading’ is a misnomer because it 
applies to trading by persons who are not insiders of the corporate issuer.”); ABA Comm. on 
Fed. Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading, Part 
I: Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,  reprinted 
in 41  BUS. LAW. 223, 224 (1985) (“‘Insider trading’ is, of course, a misnomer.”). 
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 Furthermore, this treatise is concerned with  stock market insider trading, on both 
stock exchanges and the over-the-counter market, 6 and generally not with face-to-face 
transactions in closely held corporations. 7 Nevertheless, a stock market insider trade is 
not necessarily anonymous. First, it may be possible afterwards to identify the party on 
the opposite side. 8 Second, much stock market trading is in large blocks between 
parties who negotiate with each other. Block trades blur the line between face-to-face 
and so-called “anonymous” stock market transactions. 9 
 § 1.2 OVERVIEW OF CONTENTS
 This treatise analyzes the application of various laws to stock market insider trading 
and tipping. Among the federal laws are Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act) 
Section 16, Exchange Act Section 10(b), SEC Rule 10b-5, mail/wire fraud (11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1341, 1343), SEC Rule 14e-3, and Securities Act Section 17(a). The state law
discussed is the insider trader’s liability to the issuer and (under common law) to the
party on the other side of the transaction. Other chapters address government enforce-
ment of the insider trading/tipping prohibitions and compare the harmful and allegedly
beneficial effects of stock market insider trading.
 Corporate law practitioners and others concerned with securities law compliance 
and prevention of illegal insider trading and tipping will be especially interested in 
the contents of this treatise, and particularly Chapter 13 (“Compliance Programs”). 
Chapter 13 analyzes and provides practical suggestions about compliance programs 
for corporations, financial intermediaries, and professional firms. 
 The interrelationship of many of the chapters in this treatise may be best demon-
strated with a hypothetical situation. Assume that the SEC and the Justice Department 
accuse an individual of illegally tipping or trading on material nonpublic information 
about a publicly traded stock. The treatise examines the array of laws, regulations, and 
legal counseling that relate to the alleged misconduct. 
 In this context, the following “five fingers of federal fraud” are particularly important: 
 1. The Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 classical “special relationship” theory, endorsed by
the United States Supreme Court. 10 
 6  For a brief discussion of how these markets function, see  i nfra § 3.3.1. 
 7  Section 15.2  infra on the state common law of insider trading, analyzes close corporation cases 
because of the paucity of common law cases involving stock market transactions. 
 8  See  infra § 6.7 notes 486–496 and accompanying text. 
 9  See  infra § 3.3.1. For discussion of the related difficulty of drawing the line between “fortu-
itous” and “nonfortuitous” stock transactions, see  i nfra § 8.2.2. 
10  For discussion of the classical “special relationship” theory, see  infra §§ 5.2, 5.3.  United States 
v. O’Hagan , 521 U.S. 642, 651–652 (1997), called this doctrine the “‘traditional’ or ‘classical’
theory of insider trading liability.” For discussion of  O’Hagan , see  infra §§ 4.4.5, 4.5.2[B], 5.4 
& notes 550–553, 5.4.1[B], 9.3.3.
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 2. The Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 misappropriation doctrine, also endorsed by the
Supreme Court. 11 
 3. Federal mail and wire fraud, which the Supreme Court has unanimously held
applies to stock market insider trading and tipping and which the Congress has
since further broadened. 12 
 4. SEC Rule 14e-3, regulating insider trading and tipping in the context of tender
offers. 13 
 5. Securities Act Section 17(a). 14 
 One of the most potent weapons is Exchange Act Section 10(b)/SEC Rule 10b-5. 
Initially, one must determine whether the subject party’s conduct met the many require-
ments of a Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 violation. 15 For example, was the information 
material 16 and nonpublic? 17 Did the individual have the requisite scienter? 18 Did the 
accused breach a duty to disclose under the two principal bases of Section 10(b)/Rule 
10b-5 liability: the classical “special relationship” theory 19 and the misappropriation 
doctrine? 20 As will be addressed in this treatise, the Supreme Court has endorsed both 
of these approaches. 21 
 The courts use different terms to describe what this treatise calls the classical “spe-
cial relationship” theory, or, more simply, the “special relationship” theory. In  Dirks v. 
SEC , 22 the Supreme Court referred to a “special relationship” between the insider 
11  See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 649–666 (1997). For discussion of the misap-
propriation theory, see  infra §§ 4.5.2, 5.4. For discussion of  O’Hagan , see  infra §§ 4.4.5, 
4.5.2[B], 5.4 & notes 550–553, 5:4.1[B], 9.3.3. 
12  For discussion of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes, see  infra Chapter 11. 
13  For discussion of SEC Rule 14e-3, see  infra Chapter 9. 
14  For discussion of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, see  infra Chapter 10.
 For a brief summary of when stock market insider trading and tipping violates federal securi-
ties law and some of the remedies and sanctions, see Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading: 
Victims, Violators and Remedies—Including an Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a Used Car With 
a Generic Defect, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 27, 45–63, 66–67 (2000). For another concise description of 
the federal law regulating insider trading (including Section 16), see ABA Comm. on Corporate 
Laws, Section of Bus. Law, Corporate Director’s Guidebook 98–101 (5th ed. 2007);  CORPORATE 
DIRECTOR ’ S GUIDEBOOK, FIFTH EDITION , 62  BUS. LAW. 1479, 1542–1544 (2007). For a brief descrip-
tion of SEC Rule 10b-5’s application to insider trading, see Haynes,  Insider Trading Under Rule 
10b-5 , 29  A.L.I.-A.B.A. BUS. L. COURSE MATERIALS J. No. 5, at 5 (Oct. 2005). For a “gallery” on 
the development of the law of insider trading, see “Fair to All People: The SEC and the Regulation 
of Insider Trading,” available at www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it. For the transcript of 
a May 22, 2007 “fireside chat” on the regulation of insider trading, see http://c0403731.cdn.cloud-
files.rackspacecloud.com/collection/programs/Transcript_2007_0522_Insider.pdf. 
15  For discussion of several of these requirements, see  infra §§ 4.1–4.6. 
16  For the definition of “material” under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see  infra § 4.2. 
17  For the definition of “nonpublic” under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see  infra § 4.3. 
18  For discussion of scienter under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see  infra § 4.4. 
19  For discussion of the classical “special relationship theory,” see  infra §§ 5.2, 5.3. 
20  For discussion of the misappropriation doctrine,  infra § 5.4. 
21  See sources cited  supra notes 10–11. 
22  463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
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trader and the party on the other side of the trade. 23 In his dissent in  Chiarella v. United 
States , 24 Justice Blackmun said that the majority required a “special relationship.” 25 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has employed the term “traditional 
theory” for the same concept. 26 Similarly, other federal appellate courts have used the 
phrase “classical theory.” 27 In  United States v. O’Hagan , 28 the Supreme Court referred 
to the “‘traditional’ or ‘classical theory’ of insider trading liability.” 29 All these terms 
are synonymous. 
 The classical “special relationship” is a triangle: 
 At the apex of the triangle is the issuer (A) of the stock traded. At the left base of the 
triangle is the “corporate insider” trader/tipper (B-1). At the right base of the triangle 
is the innocent party (C) on the other side of the insider trade. The “corporate insider” 
trader/tipper (B-1) is in the triangle usually because of his direct or  indirect employ-
ment by the issuer. 30 The innocent party (C) on the other side of the trade is in the 
23  See  id. at 656 n.15 (stating that “we do not believe that the mere receipt of information from an 
insider creates such a special relationship between the tippee and the corporation’s shareholders”). 
24  455 U.S. 222 (1980). 
25  Id .  at 246 (“Such confinement in this case is now achieved by imposition of a requirement of a 
‘special relationship’ akin to a fiduciary duty before the statute gives rise to a duty to disclose 
or to abstain from trading upon material, nonpublic information.”) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted). See id . at 246 n.1 (“The Court fails to specify whether the obligations of a 
special relationship.”) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
26  See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 564–566 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
27  See, e.g., SEC v. Maio, 51 F. 3d 623, 631 (7th Cir. 1995); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F. 2d 403, 
408–409 (7th Cir. 1991; SEC v. Clark, 915 F. 2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990). 
28  521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
29  Id. at 641. See  id. at 652 (employing the term “classical theory”). 
30  For discussion of why employees (B-1) are in the classical special relationship triangle, see 
 infra §§ 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.2.3[A]. Independent contractors of the issuer are in the triangle in the 
same position as employees (B-1). See  infra § 5.2.3[B]. The issuing corporation itself should 
also be in the triangle in the same position as an employee (B-1). See  infra § 5.2.3[C]. 




OUTSIDE TRIANGLE, BUT MAY BE
PARTICIPANT AFTER THE FACT IN B-
1’S VIOLATION] 
INNOCENT PARTY ON SIDE OF TRADE
(C) (ALREADY A S/H OR BECOMES ONE
WITH THE TRADE)
 Figure 1.1 
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triangle because of his ownership of at least one share of stock of the issuer (A). 
This shareholder (C) has invested in the company or “steps into the shoes” of an 
original investor. 
 Because of their  mutual relationship to the issuer, the “corporate insider” trader/
tipper and the party on the other side of the trade have a special relationship. The 
special relationship creates a duty to disclose. 31 
 Under the classical special relationship theory, a “corporate insider”/tipper (B-1) 
breaches his fiduciary duty by tipping only if he receives a  personal benefit from the 
disclosure. 32 The outsider/tippee may be liable if the “corporate insider”/tipper breaches 
a duty by tipping and if the tippee (B-2) knows or should know of that breach. In that 
instance, the tippee (B-2) participates after the fact in the “corporate insider”/tipper’s 
(B-1) breach of a duty to disclose to the party (C) on the other side of the  tippee ’s 
trade. 33 
 Many stock market insider traders or tippers may avoid liability under the classical 
special relationship theory. One example is someone who is neither an employee of the 
issuer, the equivalent of an employee, nor a direct or indirect tippee of such an employee 
or employee-equivalent. 34 
 To fill this gap, the Supreme Court has endorsed the misappropriation doctrine. 35 
This theory bases Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability on a breach of duty to the 
information source. 36 
 As this treatise addresses, one key issue is whether liability is premised on the 
defendant’s merely possessing the inside information or the defendant’s actual “use” 
of the information in deciding to trade. Responding to this issue, the SEC in 2000 
adopted Rule 10b5-1. With certain exceptions, Rule 10b5-1 posits that Section 10(b) 
insider trading liability generally arises when someone trades while “aware” of material 
nonpublic information. 37 
For discussion of whether a “temporary insider” may be in the triangle in the same position as 
an employee (B-1), even if the “temporary insider” is neither an employee nor an independent 
contractor of the issuer, see  infra § 5.2.3[D]. For discussion of whether a controlling or large 
shareholder may be in the triangle in the same position as an employee (B-1), see  infra 
§ 5.2.3[E]. For discussion of other  possible classical “special relationships” outside the classical 
special relationship triangle, see  infra §§ 5.2.3[F], 5.2.3[G], 5.2.3[H]. 
31  See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). For additional discussion of the classical 
“special relationship” triangle, see  infra § 5.2.1. 
32  See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). For discussion of tipper liability under the classical 
special relationship theory, see  infra § 5.2.8. 
33  For discussion of tippee liability under the classical special relationship theory, see  infra 
§ 5.3. 
34  For discussion of various other possible “special relationships” see  infra §§ 5.2.3[F]-
5.2.3[H]. 
35  See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 649–666 (1997). For discussion of  O’Hagan , see 
 infra §§ 4.4.5, 4.5.2[B], 5.4 & notes 550–553, 5.4.1[B], 9.3.3. 
36  521 U.S. at 647 (recognizing the “breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the information”); 
521 U.S. at 652 (same). 
37  For the full text of Rule 10b5-1 and the accompanying release, see SEC Rel. Nos. 33-7881, 
34-43154, IC-24599, File No. S7-31-99, 73 S.E.C. Docket 3 (Aug. 15, 2000). For discussion 
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 A summary of Rule 10b-5’s application to stock market insider trading is in SEC 
Rule 10b5-1(a): 
 General . The “manipulative and deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b) of 
the Act . . . and [Rule] 10b-5 thereunder include, among other things, the purchase 
or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information 
about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed 
directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders 
of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic 
information. 
 The release accompanying the proposed rule stated: “This language incorporates all 
theories of insider trading liability under the case law — classical insider trading, tem-
porary insider theory, tippee liability, and trading by someone who misappropriated 
the inside information. 38 
 In criminal prosecutions of insider trading or tipping, the federal mail and wire fraud 
statutes are another major weapon. In  Carpenter v. United States , 39 a unanimous 
Supreme Court held that certain insider trading and tipping defendants violated the 
federal mail fraud and wire fraud statutes. After  Carpenter , Congress in 1988 amended 
the United States Code chapter containing both the mail and wire fraud statutes to 
provide that “schemes to defraud” encompass schemes “to deprive another of the 
intangible right of honest services.” 40 This amendment enlarges the already broad 
sweep of mail/wire fraud and thereby enhances its importance in the criminal prosecu-
tion of insider trading and tipping. 
 In addition to Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 and mail/wire fraud, other federal statutes or 
SEC rules may apply. SEC Rule 14e-3 covers insider trading and tipping in the tender 
offer context. 41 Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits fraud in the offer 
or sale of securities. 42 At least in the SEC enforcement setting, the statute encompasses 
of Rule 10b5-1, see,  e.g. ,  infra §§ 4.4.5, 4.5.3, 5.2.3[C] & notes 146–151, 5.2.3[G] note 325, 
13.2.3 & note 48, 13.2.4, 13.3.3, 13.5.2[C][3], 13.6.2[B] & notes 410–415. 
  For the text of the rule as originally proposed and its accompanying release, see SEC Rel. 
Nos. 33-7787, 34-42259, IC-24209, File No. S7-31-99, 71 S.E.C. Docket 732 (Dec. 20, 1999), 
[1999–2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,846 [release hereinafter 
cited as  Proposing Release ],  available at  http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-42259.htm . 
  For the SEC staff’s answers to some frequently asked questions about Rule 10b5-1, see  
 http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/exchangeactrules-interps.htm ;  www.sec.gov/
interps/telephone/phonesupplement4.htm . 
38  See  Proposing Release , supra note 37, Sec. III.A.2 n.86 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 
U.S. 642 (1997), Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 
(1980)). 
39  484 U.S. 19, 25–28 (1987).  Carpenter is discussed in several sections of Chapter 11, including 
§§ 11.3.1 and 11.3.2[A]. 
40  18 U.S.C. § 1346,  as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-690 (1988). As amended, that statute pro-
vides: “For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a 
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” 
41  See  infra Chapter 9. 
42  See  infra §§ 10.1–10.4. 
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negligent conduct. 43 This latter statutory provision is broad enough to cover some 
 selling on insider information or tipping of  bearish nonpublic news. 44 
 The treatise also examines the civil and criminal remedies as well as penalties the 
government might seek to impose on the defendant. 45 
 Irrespective of the initiation of government actions, private civil plaintiffs may seek 
relief against an alleged insider trader or tipper. The treatise describes elements of 
private civil liability, including the remedies obtainable. 46 
 Plaintiffs may pursue express and/or implied private rights of action under various 
federal statutes and rules. For example, Section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act 
creates an  express private action for contemporaneous traders suing someone whose 
insider trade or tip violates the Exchange Act or its rules, including Section 10(b)/
Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14e-3. 47 
 The Supreme Court has recognized an implied private cause of action under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 48 but has not ruled whether such causes of action exist under 
mail/wire fraud, Securities Act Section 17(a), or SEC Rule 14e-3. 
 Nevertheless, the lower federal courts uniformly have held that a private right of 
action does not exist under the mail fraud or wire fraud statutes. 49 Likewise, lower 
federal courts have refused to imply such an action under Securities Act Section 
17(a). 50 Although some case law supports the existence of an implied private action 
under SEC Rule 14e-3, 51 this issue remains unresolved. 52 Section 20A, however, cre-
ates an express private action against Rule 14e-3 violators. 53 
 This treatise also examines Exchange Act Section 16(b), which expressly allows the 
recovery by or on behalf of the subject corporation of “short-swing” profits of statuto-
rily defined insiders who trade the company’s “equity securities.” Section 16(b)’s 
cause of action may be invoked only in specified circumstances. 54 
43  See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696–97 (1980) (holding that SEC need not prove scienter in 
actions brought for violation of Section 17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3)). For discussion of the standard of 
culpability under Section 17(a), see  infra § 10.4. 
44  See  infra §§ 10.1, 10.3, 10.4. For general discussion of Section 17(a)’s application to stock 
market insider trading and tipping, see  infra Chapter 10. 
45  See  infra Chapter 7. 
46  See  infra §§ 4.7–4.9. 
47  For discussion of Section 20A’s limitation to violations of the Exchange Act and its rules, see 
 infra § 10.7. 
48  See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 358 (1991) (stating 
that “this Court repeatedly has recognized the validity of such claims”); Herman & MacLean 
v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (“The existence of this implied remedy is simply 
beyond peradventure.”); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (observing that 
“the existence of a private cause of action . . . is now well established”). 
49  See  infra § 11.1 note 17 and accompanying text. 
50  See  infra § 10.5. 
51  See  infra § 9.4.2 note 145. 
52  See  infra § 9.4.2. 
53  See  infra §§ 6.2, 9.4.2. 
54  For discussion of Section 16(b), see  infra Chapter 14. 
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 In addition to federal law, state law may apply. This treatise discusses both (1) the 
common law liability of an insider trader to the party on the other side of the transac-
tion and (2) the liability of an insider trader to the corporation that issued the stock 
traded. 55 
 One chapter of this treatise also describes the approach to insider trading and tipping 
adopted by the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Federal Securities Code. 56 Congress has 
not adopted the ALI’s Code. 57 Nonetheless, the ALI Code provides an interesting 
comparative approach. 
 Two chapters examine the justification for the regulation of stock market insider 
trading from a policy perspective. These chapters may be of special interest to academ-
ics in law and other disciplines. One of these chapters analyzes the alleged benefits and 
detriments to society of stock market insider trading. 58 The other chapter discusses the 
harm to individual investors from insider trading in an impersonal stock market. 59 
Each stock market insider trade has specific victims, although, in practice, they are 
unidentifiable. The outstanding number of shares of a company generally remains con-
stant between the insider trade and public dissemination of the information on which 
the insider acted. With an insider  purchase of an existing issue of securities, the insider 
has more of that issue at dissemination; someone else must have less. That person is 
worse off because of the insider trade. With an insider  sale of an existing issue of secu-
rities, the insider has less of that issue at dissemination; someone else must have more. 
That person is worse off because of the insider trade. This treatise calls this phenom-
enon “the law of conservation of securities.” 60 
 Thus, this treatise’s primary focus is on the “five fingers of federal fraud,” 61 the 
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 classical special relationship theory, the Section 10(b)/
Rule 10b-5 misappropriation theory, federal mail and wire fraud, SEC Rule 14e-3, and 
Securities Act Section 17(a). These provisions are the principal weapons against stock 
market insider trading and tipping. 
55  See  infra Chapter 15. 
56  See  infra Chapter 8. 
57  See Albert,  Company Registration in its Historical Context: Evolution Not Revolution , 
9  U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 67, 79–80 (2001). 
58  See  infra Chapter 2. 
59  See  infra Chapter 3. 
60  See  infra § 3.3.5. 
61  See  supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text. 
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